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Models of Cold War behavior usually involve either the two superpower blocks as players, powers within these blocks as players, or both the blocks and the powers within them as players in some combination. But much of the world was in neither of these situations during the Cold War. Instead, much of the world was not clearly or solidly under either umbrella, but nevertheless largely followed a policy of peace, stability and cooperation nevertheless. Traditional Cold War analysis such as I laid out in the last section is insufficient to explain why there was such peace in Africa, SE Asia, South America, and the India region, just to name a few major areas with multiple nationals and forces that coexisted in relative peace during the Cold War. I believe that an alternate explanation is needed for this phenomenon. I will argue that though these nations were not directly under the thumb of one Cold War power or another (often lose alliances were formed, but these were relatively hollow – signifying everything, meaning nothing) the Cold War influenced them by affecting the incentive structures of a war so as to discourage war. I will create a model that tries to provide an explanation of this often overlooked behavior.

The players in this game will be the superpowers and the national and forces that were not directly under the control of either superpower (four players total). The forces and nations referred to were largely third world nations, there players were numerous and often seemed to have much historical, religious, and economic reasons for war. Nevertheless, during the Cold War relative peace and stability was enjoyed in these regions. The nations involved are clear (I outlined the general regions I am referring to earlier), but the forces that I refer to are less so. These forces include potentially or actually organized hierarchical powers that are capable of making war with another force or overthrowing a government by force in order to seize power. These forces are often religious, ideological, or political, but need not be so. They are actual in the sense that they are already organized, or potential in the sense that they would organize if the incentive structure provided the likelihood of great benefits resulting from this organization.

Assumptions will be made in order to structure this model. The players are assumed to be rational in the sense that they are able to make accurate predictions about not only the consequences of their own actions directly, but also the logical responses of other players who are also following their own best interests, and to follow these predictions under the constraint of their own best interest. Thus the players must be aware of their opponents rationality as well as being rational themselves. As mentioned, it is assumed that the players will tailor their actions in order to maximize their own best interests – to wage war if this will benefit them, and, or baring this, to remain at peace and perhaps even cooperate if this is in their best option.

About the Author

Phin Upham is a New York based author and blogger. His writing has appeared on blogs like The Academic Ledger. Click here to read more articles from author Phin Upham.